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Introduction1 
The European Commission (Commission) occupies a pivotal role as the key executive 
institution of the European Union (EU). The idea of establishing an autonomous community 
executive was codified in Article 157 in the Treaty of Rome and subsequently integrated into 
the Staff Regulations. Yet, the factual autonomy of the Commission remains largely 
unexplored, contributing to contradictory assessments of it (Kassim 2004). The Commission 
is seen as rifted between member-state dominance (Hooghe 2005; Kassim and Menon 2004; 
McDonald 1997; Michelmann 1978), the concern for the collective European good (Haas 
1958), DG supremacy and portfolio concerns (Cini 1997; Egeberg 1996), as well as 
professional independence (Haas 1992). Academics, politicians and Commission officials 
seem to have different views of what the Commission is and what it should be (Durand 2006). 
The ambition of this study is to reassess the factual behavioural autonomy of the Commission, 
while also unpacking organisational conditions that support Commission autonomy. 
 
Based on survey and interview data on temporary Commission officials (seconded national 
experts - or SNEs) (see below), this article demonstrates that the Commission blends 
departmental, epistemic and supranational behavioural dynamics, thereby largely 
safeguarding the behavioural autonomy of the Commission. It is also argued that in order to 
understand Commission autonomy, the organisational anatomy of the Commission has to be 
carefully considered. The independent variables considered are the following four:  
¾ the organisational composition of the Commission services 
¾ organisational incompatibilities across levels of governance  
¾ recruitment procedures of Commission officials through a so-called “submarine” 
approach 
¾ socialisation dynamics inside the Commission  
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Commission autonomy has been measured differently in the literature. Suggested yardsticks 
include (i) organisational traits of the administrative services that transcend the territorial 
principle of organisation (e.g. Egeberg 2006), (ii) the recruitment of permanent Commission 
Administrators outside member-state control (e.g. Egeberg 2006), (iii) socialisation processes 
of Commission officials towards supranational loyalties (e.g. Hooghe 2005; McDonald 1997), 
and (iv) role dynamics among member-state officials attending Commission expert 
committees (e.g. Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal 2003). For example, studies of the 
recruitment of Commission officials (Egeberg 2006) and studies of the behavioural dynamics 
within the College of Commissioners (Egeberg 2006; Smith 2003) picture the Commission as 
guided by portfolio and collective concerns and responsibilities largely outside member-state 
influence. Moreover, studies of political attitudes among top Commission officials view these 
attitudes as mainly based on nation-state (socialisation) processes, thus severely challenging 
Commission autonomy (Hooghe 2005). Similarly, a vast literature pictures the Commission 
as increasingly integrated, fuzed and meshed with national government systems through 
committees, networks and agencies. Models of the Commission as the central hub in a joint 
community administration that spans levels of governance view the Commission as largely 
lacking autonomy by being integrated into webs of external institutions, actors and processes 
(Hofman and Turk 2006: 583; Trondal 2001).  
 
This study claims that the anatomy of autonomy should be assessed by considering the factual 
behavioural and role dynamics evoked by individual Commission officials. The Commission, 
like most executive institutions, has an inbuilt tension between different dynamics, notably 
intergovernmental, supranational, departmental and epistemic dynamics (Trondal 2006). It is 
argued here that behavioural and role dynamics that transcend intergovernmentalism support 
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Commission autonomy. By shifting patterns of co-operation and conflict from territorial lines 
towards communitarian (supranational), sectoral (departmental) and professional (epistemic) 
lines, the factual autonomy of the Commission vis-à-vis the member-states is safeguarded. 
Whereas intergovernmental behavioural dynamics uphold territorial preferences, concerns, 
roles and loyalties, the latter three dynamics severely weaken the extent to which territorial 
concerns are represented within the Commission. Commission autonomy thus rests on a de-
territorialisation of the behavioural dynamics inside the Commission. Supranational behaviour 
denotes that SNEs have a strong “cosmopolitan” Commission loyalty towards the whole 
organisation, and that they act on written or unwritten mandates issued by the Commission 
politico-administrative leadership. Departmental behaviour is guided by administrative rules 
and procedures codified in the portfolios assigned to SNEs. Finally, epistemic behaviour is 
guided by professional expertise and the educational background of the SNEs, loosely knit to 
fixed mandates from the Commission leadership. The behavioural and role dynamics evoked 
by SNEs is empirically measured by considering their contact patterns, their emphasis on 
proposals, statements and arguments from different institutions, their loyalties, and their 
feeling of allegiances. 
 
Whereas previous studies has primarily studied permanent Commision full-timers (top and 
medium rank officials as well as Commissioners),2 this study unpacks one under-researched 
laboratory of the Commission: SNEs. SNEs are one under-research segment of Commission 
officials that may serve as a critical case of Commission autonomy. SNEs are recruited to the 
Commission on short term contracts (maximum four years), they remain paid by their home 
government (but get additional allowances from the Commission to pay for additional living 
costs), and the majority foresee a return to past positions in domestic ministries or agencies 
when their temporary contracts come to an end (CLENAD 2003). Arguably, these officials 
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are less likely to act autonomously vis-à-vis their member-state than permanent Commission 
officials. Our claim is therefore: If SNEs do in fact evoke supranational, departmental and/or 
epistemic behavioural and role dynamics during their short Commission career, this may 
serve as a critical test of Commission autonomy.  
 
The argument is presented as follows: the next section suggest an organisation approach to 
organisational autonomy. This perspective suggests that the autonomy of the Commission is 
considerably affected by the organisational composition of the Commission. The second 
section presents fresh survey (N=72) and interview (N=22) data on SNEs. A note of caution 
must, however, be exercised: Due to the limited size of the data as well as the overly 
Scandinavian bias of the samples, conclusions are drawn with caution. Nevertheless, the 
empirical observations presented are the only available observations on temporary 
Commission officials at present, thus rendering the observations vital. The data presented also 
represents a crucial test of Commission autonomy, thus rendering small N studies analytically 
significant. 
 
The Anatomy of Autonomy: An organisational Approach 
Whereas Lipsky (1980: 19) claimed that bureaucratic autonomy is driven by actors’ 
conspicuous desire for maximising their own autonomy, we claim that bureaucratic autonomy 
is organisationally contingent. It is the formal rules established in a bureaucracy that regulate, 
constitute and construct the decision-making behaviour and role perceptions evoked by civil 
servants, ultimately advancing bureaucratic autonomy (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 3). The 
organisational approach outlined here claims that the behavioural autonomy of SNEs is 
considerably affected by the organisational structures embedding them. The following four 
organisational factors are discussed below: (i) the organisational composition of the 
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Commission, (ii) degrees of organisational compatibility across levels of governance, (iii) 
recruitment procedures of SNEs, and (iv) socialisation dynamics within the Commission. 
Arguably, the tension between contending behavioural and role dynamics reflects the formal 
organisation of executive institutions. Accordingly, “organization is itself a mobilization of 
bias in preparation for action” (Schattschneider 1975: 30).  
 
Civil servants live with a constant overload of potential and inconsistent information that may 
be attended to at decision situations. Formal organisations guide the decision-making 
behaviour of civil servants due to the computational limitations and the need for selective 
search among the latter. Organisations provide collective order out of cognitive disorders by 
creating local rationalities among the organisational members (March and Shapira 1992). 
Formal organisations are systematic devices for simplifying, classifying, routinising, directing 
and sequencing information towards particular decision situations (Schattschneider 1975: 58). 
Formal organisations “are collections of structures, rules and standard operating procedures 
that have a partly autonomous role in political life” guiding officials to systematically 
de/emphasise certain aspects of reality (March and Olsen 2005: 4). The limited cognitive 
capacities of civil servants are systematised by vertical and horizontal specialisation of formal 
organisations. By specialising organisations, each civil servant is assigned a formal role that 
specifies what problems, solutions and consequences s/he should de/emphasise (Egeberg 
1999). Organisational specialisation leads to local rationalities and local and routinised 
learning cycles among the incumbents (Haas 2004: 587; Olsen 2005: 12). Moreover, 
organisational specialisation renders mid-level bureaucrats identifying with organisational 
sub-goals (Cox 1969: 212). Derived from this organisational approach, the following sub-
sections suggest four independent variables that systematically affect behavioural autonomy. 
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The organisational composition of the Commission  
Political orders are hybrids and inconsistent collections “of institutions that fit more or less 
into a coherent system” (Ansell 2004: 234; March and Olsen 2005: 8). Organisations tend to 
accumulate conflicting organisational principles through horizontal and vertical specialisation 
(Olsen 2005). When specialising formal organisations horizontally, two conventional 
principles have been suggested by Luther Gulick (1937). First, formal organisations may be 
specialised by the major purpose served – like research, health, food safety, etc. This principle 
of organisation tends to activate patterns of co-operation and conflicts among incumbents 
along sectoral (departmental) cleavages (Egeberg 2006). Co-ordination and contact patterns 
tend to be channelled within departmental portfolios rather than between them. Arguably, 
organisation by major purpose served is likely to bias decision-making dynamics towards a 
departmental logic where preferences, contact patterns, roles and loyalties are directed 
towards portfolios, DGs and units. This mode of horizontal specialisation results in less than 
adequate horizontal co-ordination across departmental units and better co-ordination within 
units (Ansell 2004: 237). The Commission DG and unit structure is a prominent example of 
this horizontal principle of specialisation (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). The Commission is a 
horizontally pillarised system of government specialised by purpose and with fairly weak 
organisational capabilities for horizontal co-ordination at the top through Presidential 
command (Dimitrakopoulos and Kassim 2005).  
 
A second principle of horizontal specialisation present within the Commission is the principle 
of the major process utilised – like administration, legal service, personnel services, etc. 
(Gulick 1937). This horizontal principle encourages the horizontal integration of functional 
departments and the disintegration of the major purposes served. Within the Commission the 
internal services like Legal Service and DG for Translation illustrates the process principle. 
 9
Arguably, organisation by major process is conducive to departmental and epistemic 
behaviour among the incumbents. The Commission is primarily organised horizontally by 
purpose, only secondary by function (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). 
 
However, the Commission also embodies a territorial principle of organisation as well as a 
party political component. Territorial concerns are embedded into the Commission services 
by the recruitment of de facto national officials (which is particularly strong in the case of 
SNEs) among Administrators, Cabinets and Commissioners. A party component is organised 
into the College, particularly because Commissioners have become increasingly political 
heavyweights and because of the creeping parliamentarisation of the College (MacMullen 
1997; Nugent 2006). However, Egeberg (2006: X) argues that “territorial components in the 
organisational structure have become continuously weakened”, and the party political 
component are non-existing at the level of SNEs.  
 
In sum, the Commission is a ‘multi-organisation’ horizontally specialised primarily according 
to two conventional principles of organisation (Christiansen 1997), contributing to “sending 
ambivalent signals to Commission officials” (Hooghe 1997: 105). During the contract period, 
the Commission serves as their primary organisational affiliation, rendering them particularly 
sensitive to the multiple organisational signals and selections provided by the Commission 
organisation. Hence, the horizontal specialisation of the Commission administration by 
purpose and process is conducive to autonomisation of the behavioural dynamics of SNEs 
(departmental and epistemic behaviour).  
 
Organisational compatibility 
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Behavioural and role autonomy among SNEs is arguably also strengthened by some degrees 
of organisational incompatibility between the domestic ministries and agencies from which 
SNEs originate, and the Commission. Organisational incompatibility creates mutual 
insulations of actors and organisations, thereby establishing organisational boundaries that 
support organisational autonomy. One impact of organisational incompatibility is behavioural 
and role autonomy. This novelty argument claims that organisational incompatibility 
establishes autonomous cognitive scripts and codes of appropriate behaviour in different 
organisations (Coser 1975). Due to organisational incompatibilities, the territorially 
specialised Council of Ministers has for example less impact on domestic sector ministries 
than on domestic foreign ministries (Larsson and Trondal 2005). Hence, when officials – like 
SNEs – change organisational location that is highly incompatible to the previous 
organisation, they are challenged to change behavioural and role dynamics accordingly 
(Hooghe 2005). Arguably, SNEs who receive portfolios within the Commission that depart 
significantly from previous domestic portfolios are likely to experience a cognitive challenge 
towards shifting behaviour and role. Organisational incompatibility is measured by the extent 
to which SNEs have incompatible portfolios, or perceptions thereof, between their current 
Commission position and their previous positions in domestic ministries and agencies. For 
example, SNEs entering the Commission for the first time are likely to discover non-
compatible working environments (March 1994: 70). For example, the physical structure of 
the Commission building, the presence of blue flag with the golden stars together with the 
member-state flags may strengthen perceptions of novelty and organisational incompatibility 
(Egeberg 2006). Arguably, the sheer perception of organisational incompatibility is arguably 
conducive to the emergence of a supranational behavioural and role dynamic among SNEs. 
By contrast, SNEs are more likely to experience compatible working environments between 
the Commission units they are affiliated to and domestic ministries. Organisational 
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compatibility at unit level is likely to support departmental and epistemic behavioural and role 
dynamics (see above). 
 
Recruitment procedures 
Finally, the autonomy of organisations may be greatly affected by the procedures applied to 
recruit staff. Different procedures for recruitment tend to bring in different people and keep 
them more or less autonomous vis-à-vis past constituencies (Cox 1969; Mouritzen 1990: 39). 
Basically, recruitment may be based on a merit principle, as in most Western democracies, or 
on a quota principle or other systems of patronage or parachutage, as in the top echelon of the 
American civil service (Ingraham 1995: 9). Whereas the merit principle recruits permanent 
civil servants on the basis of competence and past achievements, the quota principle typically 
recruits officials on more temporary contracts on the basis of, for example, professional, 
sectoral or territorial mandates (Bekke and van der Meer 2000: 281-282; Ingraham 1995: xix). 
SNEs are not recruited in the open competition process to vacancies based on a written test, 
but in a more opaque process described by Stevens and Stevens (2001: 87) as a “submarine 
approach” or as an entry in the back door to the Commission services. In the Commission, 
initiates vacancies and the final selection of relevant candidates for SNE contracts are co-
ordinated by the Director or Head of Unit in the relevant Commission DG (EEA 2002: 4). It is 
the Commission that determines the job description for each SNEs (administered by DG 
ADMIN), based on initial information from the member-states about particular preferences 
for particular SNEs (EEA 2002: 4). The vast majority of SNEs seem to be recruited on the 
initiative of Commission DGs as well as on personal initiatives by the SNEs (Statskontoret, 
2001:17: 34). Arguably, because the “submarine” procedure for recruitment of SNEs is 
heavily governed by the separate DGs, it is conducive to departmental behaviour among 
SNEs.  
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Socialisation dynamics 
A vast literature has revealed that the impact of pre-socialisation on actors’ is modified by 
organisational re-socialisation (e.g. Checkel 2005). National officials entering the 
Commission are subject to an organisational “exposure effect” (Johnston 2005: 1039) that 
may contribute to such re-socialisation. Socialisation processes are conducive to 
‘autonomisation’ of the socialisees because the socialisator educates, indoctrinates, teaches or 
diffuses his norms and ideas to the socialisee. Socialisation is a dynamic process whereby 
individuals are induced into the norms and rules of a given community. By this process 
individuals come to internalise the norms, rules and interests of the community (Checkel 
2005). The socialisation argument claims that behavioural autonomy is conditioned by 
enduring experiences with institutions, accompanying perceptions of in/appropriate behaviour 
(Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 14). The potential for socialisation to occur is assumed 
positively related to the duration and the intensity of interaction amongst the organisational 
members. Chief to the neo-functionalist approach, the potential for re-socialisation to occur 
(‘shift of loyalty towards a new centre’) is assumed positively related to the duration and the 
intensity of interaction among actors (Checkel 2005; Haas 1958: 16). This claim rests on 
socialisation theory that emphasises a positive relationship between the intensity of 
participation within a collective group and the extent to which members of this group develop 
perceptions of group belongingness and an esprit de corps. Arguably, the length of stay at the 
Commission – or the individual seniority of SNEs – may foster a slow re-socialisation of 
SNEs towards supranational behaviour (Trondal, 2004). Hence, behavioural and role 
autonomy is fostered by the  sheer quantity and quality of actor-interaction inside the 
Commission apparatus. 
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Data and method 
There exists no available, updated or complete list of Commission SNEs. The observations 
reported below are based on a survey and interview study among a selected sample of SNEs. 
The initial sample of 125 SNEs resulted from a short-list of SNEs provided by CLENAD3 and 
the EFTA Secretariat. The reason for using the EFTA Secretariat is that it provides updated 
online lists of SNEs from the EEA countries Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein. The survey 
data was collected through a postal inquiry conducted in 2004. After three rounds of 
reminders the final sample totals 72, giving a response rate of 58 percent. This response rate is 
low compared to surveys in domestic central administrations, but higher than recent studies 
within the Commission (e.g. Hooghe 2005). The final sample covers SNEs from 15 
Commission DGs4, five EU member-countries and two EEA countries.5 This sample is 
unfortunately strongly biased towards the Nordic countries but it suffices for analytical 
purposes. The survey is supplemented by in-depth interviews among a sub-sample of SNEs. 
22 interviews were conducted in the winter 2004 - 2005 on the basis of a semi-structured 
interview-guide. The next section is illustrated with direct quotations from transcribed 
interviews.  
 
The survey and interview data are based on a systematic selection procedure. This procedure 
does not allow for empirical generalisations. Still, “[s]mall Ns can yield big conclusions” 
(Andersen 2003: 3 – original emphasis). One road to empirical generalisations is by reference 
to other empirical studies that support or reject our findings (see the conclusion). In addition, 
our empirical observations are interpreted by reference to the organisational approach outlined 
above. However, the low number of respondents implies that the conclusions are indeed 
suggestive. 
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The autonomy of SNEs 
A considerable part of the output crafted by the Commission is initiated, drafted and put on 
the agenda at the administrative level. Hence, to understand Commission decision-making one 
has to unpack the decision-making behaviour and role perceptions evoked by Commission 
Administrators, including SNEs. Of the Commission workforce of about 7 400 full-time 
policy-making Administrators (Hooghe and Nugent 2006: 159), some 1000 officials are 
seconded on temporary posts (Trondal 2004). For example, the build-up of the EU Foreign 
Service is staffed both by EU officials and seconded member-state officials. Outside the 
Commission, government officials at the member-state level are also increasingly hired on 
temporary posts, rendering their perceived organisational memberships vague, unstable and 
ambiguous (Bartel and Dutton 2001: 116; Hall 2002). Compatible with the wishes of Jean 
Monnet when staffing the High Authority, temporary officials provide the Commission with 
additional expertise, supply learning across levels of government, secure the Commission 
with a more flexible workforce hired through a fast-track recruitment system (see below), and 
offer national officials with added experiences.  
 
The behavioural patterns of SNEs may be measured by considering their contact patterns 
(Table 1), their emphasis on proposals, statements and arguments from different institutions 
(Table 2), their loyalties (Table 3), and their feeling of allegiances (Table 4).  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
SNEs rank their contacts as follows: departmental contacts (mean=40 percent), epistemic 
contacts (mean=28 percent), supranational contacts (mean=5 percent), and intergovernmental 
contacts (mean=12 percent). First, departmental contacts are primarily directed within SNEs’ 
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own Unit and DG, and more towards fellow colleagues horizontally than with the 
administrative leadership vertically. Hence, we see a significant impact of the horizontal 
specialisation of the Commission with respect to the decision-making behaviour of the staff. 
According to one SNE, “within my Unit, there are waterproof borders between our dossiers” 
(interview – author’s translation). Inter-DG contacts are directed within dossiers rather than 
across dossiers (interviews). The interviews, however, reveal that SNEs have frequent contact 
with their Head of Unit. The Head of Unit is pictured as a central gate-keeper inside the 
Commission hierarchy (interviews). “The thing most SNEs comment on is how important the 
hierarchy in the Commission is” (CLENAD 2002: 43). According to one SNE, “I have had 
four Heads of Unit, and the working procedures have changed each time” (interview – 
author’s translation). Supporting these observations, our data also reveals that the majority of 
SNEs strongly agree on the following statement: “I have clear rules about what to do in my 
position” (55 per cent). Similarly, the vast majority of SNEs do not enjoy much behavioural 
discretion in their positions (25 per cent).6 However, departmental contacts may also reflect 
the departmentalised recruitment practices of SNEs into the Commission (the “submarine 
procedure”). Our survey data reveals that the majority of the SNEs are recruited from 
domestic agencies and ministries that correspond closely to their current Commission 
portfolio.  
 
The epistemic contacts evoked by SNEs are primarily directed towards experts inside and 
outside the Commission, towards universities and research institutions as well as towards 
Commission expert committees. The fairly weak epistemic contact patterns, as compared to 
the departmental contact patterns, may reflect the fact that SNEs are recruited outside the 
ordinary competitive track. The supranational contacts reported are weak, even when 
compared to the intergovernmental contacts.  
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Finally, intergovernmental contacts are few and mainly directed towards the governments of 
other countries rather than towards the government of their country of origin. Most SNEs 
report that their home ministry or agency seldom initiates contacts towards them and that they 
are forgotten by their home administration (interview). According to one SNE, “I have very 
little contact with my ministry back home, almost nothing” (interview – author’s translation). 
The following phrase seems to cover the impression of most SNEs: “Out of sight, out of 
mind” (CLENAD 2003: 26; Statskontoret 2001:17: 11).7 SNEs receive “very little feedback 
from capitals … and … in general they had expected to be in closer contact with their 
employer” (EFTA Secretariat 2000: 2). Some SNEs report a preference for more intensive 
contacts with their member-state ministries than offered by these ministries (The Norwegian 
Ministry of Children and Family Affairs 2004; interviews). One reason for this lack of contact 
from the home administration may be due to a lack of domestic strategy on SNEs. The 
Swedish Government admit lacking a central strategy and co-ordination of how Swedish 
SNEs should be recruitment and utilised by the Swedish Government (Statskontoret 2001:17: 
9; The Government Offices of Sweden 2002: 14).8 These observations reflect the primacy of 
the Commission for SNEs and the de facto autonomy of SNEs vis-à-vis their home 
governments. Finally, the SNEs were also asked with whom they mostly interact with outside 
office – own nationals or people with other national origins. 78 per cent report interacting 
fairly often or more with people with other national origins, whereas 47 per cent report 
interacting fairly often or more with own nationals. Hence, SNEs have a stronger non-
intergovernmental contact pattern outside office than they have at office. This may illustrate 
the impact of the organisational corpus of the Commission services as regards the behavioural 
autonomy of SNEs. 
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The overly Scandinavian bias in our sample, however, may potentially skew our observations. 
Some Scandinavian SNEs report that French SNEs have a stronger intergovernmental contact 
patterns than other SNEs: “France use the French SNEs to the maximum. They are consulted 
directly by the French Government” (interview – author’s translation). Similarly, a study by 
the Swedish government agency Statskontoret (2001:17) indicates that the British and Dutch 
governments use their SNEs instrumentally to influence the Commission. In contrast to the 
lacking Swedish SNE policy (see above), British SNE policy is both explicitly stated and 
highly co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office (Statskontoret 2001:17: 51).  
 
However, in sum Table 1 demonstrates that the contact patterns evoked by SNEs seem fairly 
autonomous (departmental and epistemic).  
 
Table 2 illustrates those proposals, statements and arguments emphasised by SNEs. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The considerations emphasised by SNEs are ranked as follows: Departmental considerations 
(mean=81 percent), supranational considerations (mean=52 percent), epistemic considerations 
(mean=52 percent), and intergovernmental considerations (mean=15 percent). Departmental 
considerations are primarily directed towards SNEs’ own Unit, own DG and other DGs 
(ranked by importance). Hence, the inter-DG friction often referred to in the literature (e.g. 
Cini 1996: 153; Smith 2003: 140) is observed among SNEs. According to one SNE, “I would 
say that the level of conflict between DGs is higher than between ministries at home” 
(interview – author’s translation). Supranational considerations are mainly directed towards 
the Commissioner (and Cabinets) of their DG. Hence, SNEs have a priority profile that is 
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strongly affected by the horizontal specialisation of the DGs, also with respect to their 
supranational behaviour. Epistemic considerations are primarily directed towards individual 
experts inside and outside the Commission. Finally, intergovernmental considerations are 
weak and equally distributed towards their own government and towards the government of 
other countries. Similarly, a vast majority of national government officials attending EU 
committees perceive Commission officials as mainly independent of particular national 
interests (Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal 2003: 34). 
 
In sum, Table 2 demonstrates that the considerations emphasised by SNEs are fairly 
autonomous (departmental, supranational and epistemic).  
 
Table 3 reveals the relative importance of intergovernmental, supranational, departmental and 
epistemic loyalties among SNEs. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
SNEs have several representational roles to play because they are partly embedded into the 
Commission and partly into the domestic administration from which they originate. One 
effect thereof is that SNEs evoke multiple loyalties (Table 3). One important observation is 
that the loyalty patterns revealed above are fairly autonomous. The two loyalties evoked most 
strongly by SNEs are epistemic and departmental. Hence, as expected, SNEs who are 
positioned in medium rank positions in the Commission hierarchy attach stronger loyalty 
towards their own DG and profession than towards the Commission as a whole. Cini (1997: 
86) also finds that “institutional identification being with the DG rather than with the 
Commission as a whole”. Moreover, SNEs also activate fairly strong supranational loyalties. 
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This observation challenges previous studies of SNEs that underscore their national loyalties 
(Coombes 1970; Smith 1973; Smith 2001). Also, the study of Hooghe (2005) found 
significant inroad of supranational loyalty among top Commission officials. Similarly, Shore 
(2000) demonstrates that a strong sense of community emerge even among new recruits to 
permanent posts. Hence, the observations reported in Table 3 support the picture of SNEs as 
having a fairly high level of behavioural and role autonomy.  
 
Finally, a bivariate correlation analysis (Pearson’s R) reveals positive correlations between 
intergovernmental loyalties on the one hand and departmental loyalties (.27*) and epistemic 
loyalties (.25*) on the other. Hence, the role perceptions evoked by SNEs are partly 
complementary. Our data demonstrate that SNEs rarely feel a conflict of loyalty between 
different constituencies, concerns and role ideals. SNEs tend to manage multiple roles (cf. 
Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 12). One SNE argue that, “my loyalty lies here with the 
Commission” (interview – author’s translation). Yet, many SNEs also agree to the dictum, “I 
think in my heart I still represent my self” (interview – author’s translation). Hence, the 
assumed loyalty conflict between domestic and supranational constituencies is challenged.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 confirms the above observations: The allegiances emphasised by SNEs are highly 
autonomous, and they rank as follows: departmental allegiances, epistemic allegiances, 
supranational allegiances, and intergovernmental allegiances. Importantly, supranational 
allegiances rank significantly higher than intergovernmental allegiances. As expected, SNEs 
evoke stronger allegiances towards their DG, Unit and professional background than towards 
the EU and the Commission as wholes. Moreover, a bivariate correlation analysis (Pearson’s 
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R) reveals strong positive correlations between allegiances towards the EU system and the 
Commission (.70**), allegiances between the Commission and the DG in which the SNEs are 
affiliated (.37**), and allegiances between the DG level and the Unit level (.63**). Hence, the 
SNEs studied tend to develop multiple allegiances within the Commission. According to one 
SNE,  
 
“I travel around as a representative for the Commission and speak on behalf of the 
Commission in mass media. I have a stronger responsibility for external contacts in 
the Commission than home in the ministry” (Interview – author’s translation). Another 
SNE argue that, “[w]e do not think according to nationality here. That is irrelevant. 
Nationality is only interesting over a cup of coffee” (interview – author’s translation).9  
 
Conclusion 
The ambition of this study has been to reassess the factual behavioural autonomy of the 
Commission, as well as organisational conditions thereof. It is argued that SNEs serve as a 
critical case of Commission autonomy due to their fairly ambiguous affiliation towards the 
Commission. Empirically, the study demonstrates that the behavioural and role dynamics of 
SNEs blends departmental, epistemic and supranational dynamics. Moreover, these 
behavioural and role dynamics support the factual autonomy of the Commission. The 
suspicion early voiced by Coombes (1970) that SNEs are highly conscious of their national 
background is thus challenged by this study. A long lived assumption in the literature has 
been that the “secondment system would tend to produce an unmanageable cacophony” of 
officials loyal to the national civil service (Cox 1969: 208). For example, the Spierenburg 
Report § 110) argued that, “…[t]he Commission should ensure that the use made of national 
experts does not rise significantly above its present level, or again the risk is run of distorting 
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the European character of the administration”. This article severely challenges such claims. 
Moreover, as a least likely case of Commission autonomy, this study serves as a robust test 
thereof.  
 
It is also argued that Commission autonomy is considerably conditioned by the organisational 
anatomy of the Commission organisation. The independent variables considered are the 
following four: (i) the organisational composition of the Commission services, (ii) 
organisational incompatibilities across levels of governance, (iii) recruitment procedures of 
Commission officials through a so-called “submarine” approach, and (iv) socialisation 
dynamics inside the Commission. The empirical observations presented merely illustrate that 
the behavioural and role dynamics of SNEs are indeed affected by these organisational 
factors. For example, the contact patterns and institutional allegiances among SNEs strongly 
echo the organisational boundaries of the Commission DGs and units (i). Secondly, the 
supranational loyalties and allegiances evoked by SNEs reflect both the organisational 
incompatibilities experienced among SNEs across levels of government (ii), and processes of 
socialisation inside the Commission (iv). Finally, the departmental contact patterns observed 
reflect the departmentalised recruitment practices of SNEs to the Commission (the 
“submarine procedure”). The data reveals that the majority of the SNEs are recruited from 
domestic agencies and ministries that correspond closely to their current Commission 
portfolio. Moreover, the fairly weak epistemic contact patterns, as compared to the strong 
departmental contact patterns, may reflect the fact that SNEs are recruited outside the 
ordinary competitive track.  
 
Hence, the autonomy of the Commission is organisationally contingent and not only subject 
to what Lipsky (1980:19) calls actors’ conspicuous desire for autonomy. One implication of 
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our findings is that Commission autonomy is elastic and sensitive to reforms of the 
Commission apparatus. Reforms such as the new rules for horizontal mobility of Commission 
officials, reforms of the DG and Unit structure, and increased focus on meritocracy in 
promoting staff are likely to impact on Commission autonomy. According to the 
organisational approach outlined here, bureaucratic autonomy is contingent on the 
organisational embeddedness of the bureaucrats. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Percent of SNEs who have the following contact patterns (percent).*, 1)   
1) Intergovernmental contacts: 
- with the government of their country of origin 
- with the governments of other countries 
 
9  
14 
2) Supranational contacts: 
- with the Commissioner (and Cabinet) of their DG 
- with Commissioners of other DGs 
- with the Council of Ministers 
- with the European Parliament 
 
5  
5  
6  
2  
3) Departmental contacts: 
- with the Director General of their DG 
- with the Director of their Directorate 
- with colleagues within their Unit 
- with colleagues within other units in their DG 
- with colleagues in other DGs  
 
3 
18  
97  
56  
27  
4) Epistemic contacts: 
- with individuals inside the Commission whom they respect for their expertise 
- with individuals outside the Commission whom they respect for their 
expertise 
- with the Commission expert committees 
- with universities or research institutions 
 
36  
 
27  
22 
25  
Mean N 100  
(67) 
*) Original question: “How frequently do you have contacts and meetings with the following during a typical 
week?” 
1) The variables listed include officials having contacts fairly often, or very often with the respective institutions. 
This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: very often (value 1), fairly often (value 2), both/and 
(value 3), fairly seldom (value 4), and very seldom (value 5).  
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Table 2: Percent of SNEs who emphasise proposals, statements and arguments from the 
following institutions (percent).*, 1)  
1) Intergovernmental considerations: 
-    from the government of their country of origin 
-    from the government of other countries 
 
14  
15  
2) Supranational considerations: 
- from the Commissioner (and the Cabinet) of their DG 
- from Commissioners of other DGs 
- from the Council of Ministers 
- from the European Parliament 
 
76  
43  
48  
39  
3) Departmental considerations: 
- from the Director General of their DG 
- from the Director of their Directorate 
- from their own Unit 
- from other units within their DG 
- from other DGs  
 
75  
87  
99  
81  
63  
4)  Epistemic considerations: 
- from individuals inside the Commission whom they respect for their expertise 
- from individuals outside the Commission whom they respect for their expertise 
- from Commission expert committees 
- from universities or research institutions 
 
72  
62  
43  
32  
Mean N:  100  
(62) 
*) Original question: “When working as a seconded national expert in the Commission, how much consideration 
do you put on proposals, statements and arguments from the following?” 
1) The variables listed include officials emphasising proposals, statements and arguments from the respective 
institutions fairly much, or very much. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: very much 
(value 1), fairly much (value 2), both/and (value 3), fairly little (value 4), and very little (value 5).  
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Table 3: Percent of SNEs emphasising the following four loyalties (absolute numbers in 
parantheses)* 
 Fairly much or 
very much 
Both/and Fairly little or 
very little 
Total 
Intergovernmental loyalty: 
- Loyalty towards the member-
states as a group 
 
 
47 
 
 
30 
 
 
23 
 
100 
(66) 
Supranational loyalty: 
- Loyalty towards the 
Commission as a whole 
 
 
65 
 
 
15 
 
 
20 
 
100 
(66) 
Departmental loyalty: 
- Loyalty towards the Director 
General of their own DG 
 
 
66 
 
 
16 
 
 
18 
 
100 
(67) 
- Loyalty towards the Director 
of their own Directorate 
 
78 
 
12 
 
10 
100 
(68) 
- Neutral enforcement of 
decisions and established 
regulations within the 
Commission 
 
 
 
75 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
100 
(64) 
Epistemic loyalty: 
- Professional neutrality within 
their own position 
 
 
88 
 
 
9 
 
 
3 
 
100 
(65) 
* Original question: “How much emphasis do you generally put on the following considerations?”  
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Table 4: Percent of SNEs feeling an allegiance (identify or feel responsible to) towards 
the following (absolute numbers in parentheses)* 
 Fairly strongly 
or very 
strongly 
Both/and Fairly weakly or 
very weakly 
Total 
Intergovernmental 
allegiance: 
 - Towards the 
government of their own 
country 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
 
 
100 
(65) 
Supranational 
allegiance: 
- Towards the EU system 
as a whole 
 
 
 
63 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
100 
(64) 
- Towards the 
Commission as a whole 
 
69 
 
22 
 
9 
100 
(67) 
Departmental allegiance: 
- Towards their own DG  
 
84 
 
9 
 
7 
100 
(68) 
- Towards their own Unit  84 10 6 100 
(68) 
Epistemic allegiance: 
- Towards their own 
professional (educational) 
background and expertise 
 
 
 
76 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
100 
(67) 
* Original question: “When working as a seconded national expert in the Commission, whom of the following do 
you feel an allegiance to (identify or feel responsible to)?” 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 This paper is financed by the research project “DISC: Dynamics of International Executive Institutions” (the 
Norwegian Research Council), and by “CONNEX: Connecting Excellence on European Governance” (the EUs 
6th. Framework Programme, priority 7: Citizens and Governance). Thanks to Lene Jeppesen Ceeberg for 
research assistance and to Torbjorn Larsson for research collaboration.   
2 One clear exception to this is the studies of Commission expert committees, mainly staffed with part-time 
participating member-state officials (e.g. Egebeg, Schaefer and Trondal 2003). 
3 CLENAD is the staff organisation for SNEs in the Commission. 
4 The DGs covered by the study are: DG Education and Culture, DG Employment and Social Affairs, DG 
Enterprise, DG Environment, DG Energy and Transport, Eurostat, DG Fisheries, DG Health and Consumer 
Affairs, DG Information Society, DG Research, DG Taxation and Customs Union, DG Economic and Financial 
Affairs, DG Trade, DG Competition, and DG Development.  
5 EU member-states covered: Sweden (N=37), Denmark (N=3), Ireland (N=2), Germany (N=4) and France 
(N=1). EEA countries covered: Norway (N=20) and Iceland (N=2). Three respondents did not report their 
country of origin.  
6 These numbers are not reported in Table 1 
7 Similar observations are done in the Council of Europe (MacMullen 2004: 418). 
8 Some times SNEs are recruited from national agencies without the knowledge of the ministry (Statskontoret 
2001:17: 27). 
9 SNEs also have a supranational allegiance when measured as follows: “I put forward proposals I think is in the 
best interests of the member-states as a group” (73 percent strongly agree), and “I put forward proposals I think 
is in the best interest of the EU” (87 percent strongly agree). 
